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CALIFORNIA'S UNFAIR COMPETITION ACT:
WILL IT GIVE RISE TO YET ANOTHER 'WAVE'
IN SMOKING AND HEALTH LITIGATION?
Seong Hwan Kim*
I. INTRODUCTION
Public concern about the carcinogenic effects of tobacco
use heightened in 1954 when scientists at the Memorial
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center discovered that tobacco tar
induced cancerous tumors in mice.1 To address the public's
concern, in 1962, Congress formed an investigative advisory
committee. That committee concluded in 1964 that cigarette
smoking is causally related to lung cancer, chronic bronchitis,
emphysema and coronary artery disease.2
The tobacco industry's response to this adverse scientific
evidence was a full-page advertisement entitled "A Frank
Statement to Cigarette Smokers."3 In this advertisement,
the tobacco industry announced that it "accept[ed] an interest
in people's health as a basic responsibility, paramount to
every other consideration in [its] business."4 Further, the to-
bacco industry announced that it would establish and fund a
* J.D. 1993, University of California at Los Angeles; B.S. 1990, Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley, Walter A. Haas School of Business. The author
would like to thank the following persons: Yeong J. Kim, Mariko Yoshihara,
Hong J. Kim, Hyeon S. Kim and Kevin Wong.
1. Alix M. Freedman & Laurie P. Cohen, Smoke and Mirrors, How Ciga-
rette Makers Keep Health Question "Open" Year After Year, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11,
1993, at Al.
2. ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH
(1964).
3. The author does not have access to some of the evidence to which this
article refers. Thus, the author will quote secondary sources that reference this
evidence. Freedman & Cohen, supra note 1, at Al.
4. Freedman & Cohen, supra note 1, at Al; see also Brief for Plaintiff's
Jury Demand at 9, Cordova v. Liggett Group Inc., (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992) (No.
651824) [hereinafter Cordova Jury Demand].
Another advertisement commissioned by the tobacco industry read as fol-
lows: "We recognize that we have a special responsibility to the public-to help
scientists determine the facts about tobacco and health, and about certain dis-
eases that have been associated with tobacco use." Id.
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new research group, the Council for Tobacco Research
(CTR),5 that would be completely "autonomous" despite its
funding source and would fully investigate and disclose to the
public all information about tobacco use and health.'
Almost 40 years after the creation of the CTR, emerging
evidence indicates that the tobacco industry's pledge to fairly
research and report the health effects of tobacco use was a
public relations hoax and the CTR functioned as a front for
this scheme.7 In sharp contrast to the tobacco industry's as-
5. See Hearing of the Health and Environment Subcommittee of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, May 26, 1994; Cor-
dova Jury Demand, supra note 4, at 9. The Council for Tobacco Research was
originally named the Tobacco Industry Research Council.
6. See Freedman & Cohen, supra note 1, at Al, A6; Cordova Jury Demand,
supra note 4, at 9.
The tobacco industry published an advertisement entitled "A Statement
About Tobacco and Health" that acknowledged, in relevant part:
We accepted this responsibility in 1954 by establishing the Tobacco In-
dustry Research Committee, which provides research grants to in-
dependent scientists. We pledge continued support of this program of
research until the facts are known ....
We shall continue all possible efforts to bring the facts to light. In that
spirit we are cooperating with the Public Health Service in its plan to
have a special study group review all presently available research ....
Cordova Jury Demand, supra note 4, at 9, 10 (omission in original).
The trade association of tobacco producers, the Tobacco Institute, placed
the following advertisement during the 1970's entitled The Question About
Smoking and Health Is Still A Question:
[A] major portion of this scientific inquiry has been financed by the
people who know the most about cigarettes and have a great desire to
learn the truth... the tobacco industry.
And the industry has committed itself to this task in the most objective
and scientific way possible....
Completely autonomous, CTR's research is directed by a board of ten
scientists and physicians .... This board has full authority and respon-
sibility for policy, development and direction of the research effort.
Cordova Jury Demand, supra note 4, at 10.
Yet another advertisement commissioned by The Tobacco Institute main-
tained that the tobacco industry is "cooperating in efforts to learn and to make
known all the facts.... The Tobacco Institute believes that the American public
is entitled to complete, authenticated information about cigarette smoking and
health." Id. (emphasis added).
7. See Hearing of the Environmental Subcommittee, supra note 5. Con-
gressman Henry Waxman explained that, in response to the mounting scientific
evidence linking smoking to health diseases, the tobacco industry retained the
public relations firm of Hill & Knowlton in 1953. Hill & Knowlton recom-
mended that the tobacco industry create the Council for Tobacco Research to
research and present to the public scientific evidence negating the link between
smoking and health diseases. JOHN F. VARGO & J. D. LEE, CIPOLLONE V. LIG-
GErT GROUP, INC.: U.S. SUPREME COURT OPENS THE DOOR TO TOBACCO LAWSUITS
at 16 (1992). There is strong evidence that several tobacco companies realized,
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surance of the CTR's independence and objectivity, recent ev-
idence indicates that the tobacco industry manipulated the
CTR to perpetuate doubts about the link between smoking
and health diseases by sponsoring only those research
projects that exonerated smoking as a health hazard and by
discontinuing sponsorship of research projects that impli-
cated smoking as a health hazard.8 Moreover, through the
use of the "Special Projects" division, the tobacco industry
concealed research results that revealed a causal link be-
tween smoking and health diseases. 9 The mechanics of the
concealment were simple; because the claimed purpose of the
research sponsored by the Special Projects division was to de-
velop a field of expert witnesses to defend the tobacco indus-
by the early 1960's, that smoking caused lung cancer but, contrary to their
pledge to the public, concealed this knowledge. Cordova Jury Demand, supra
note 4, at 16.
An internal memorandum regarding a CTR meeting of October 25, 1978, in
Lexington, Kentucky, reads as follows:
After some further discussion, Janet and Arnie Henson expressed
American Tobacco Company's view that CTR must be maintained but
needed new people. It must be more politically oriented. They felt that
CTR must look at what is happening and what others are doing to see
what questions can be raised, etc. The approach must be steady, slow
and conservative. They must find skeptical scientists.... The staff at
CTR also needed to be more tobacco oriented with a skeptical view.
Cordova Jury Demand, supra note 4, at 15.
Another internal memorandum regarding a CTR meeting held in New York
in November, 1978, states as follows:
CTR began as an organization called Tobacco Industry Research Coun-
cil (TIRC). It was set up as an industry 'shield' in 1954. That was the
year statistical accusations relating smoking to diseases were leveled
at the industry; litigation began; and the Wynder/Graham reports
were issued. CTR has helped our legal counsel by giving advice and
technical information, which was needed at court trials. CTR has pro-
vided spokesmen for the industry at Congressional hearings. The mon-
ies spent on CTR provides a base for introduction of witnesses. ...
Bill Shinn feels that "special projects" are the best way that monies are
spent. On these projects, CTR has acted as a 'front'....
[B]ill Shinn mentioned that the 'public relations' value of CTR must be
considered and continued .... A very interesting point, made by Bill
Shinn ... [is that] [iut is extremely important that the industry continue
to spend their dollars on research to show that we don't agree that the
case against smoking is closed .... There is a 'CTR basket' which must
be maintained for 'PR'purposes .... It is interesting that this proposal
by Shinn is somewhat in line with the thinking we had planned to
present to the Committee later on in the day.
Cordova Jury Demand, supra note 4, at 15-16.
8. Freedman & Cohen, supra note 1, at Al, A6.
9. Id. See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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try in tort suits, information gained through Special Projects
division research was protected under the attorney work-
product privilege.' ° Thus, by channeling research projects
with adverse results into the Special Projects division, the
CTR was able to conceal their results from public
disclosure. 1
If allegations of industry-wide conspiracy to defraud the
public about the health hazards of smoking are substanti-
ated, the tobacco industry could face huge civil liabilities.
However, suing the tobacco industry has been difficult at
best.' 2 Over the years, plaintiffs have unsuccessfully sued
10. See generally CAL. CODE CIV. PROc. § 2018 (West 1987); BP Alaska Ex-
ploration, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 245 Cal. Rptr. 682, 685 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that the "crime fraud exception provided in [California] Evidence Code section
956 does not apply to writings protected by the absolute [attorney] work prod-
uct rule . . ").
11. See supra note 7; see also Cordova Jury Demand, supra note 4, at 14-15.
A transcript of a conversation at a meeting held by the tobacco industry's
committee of general counsel indicates that the CTR was engaged in such con-
cealment practices:
STEVENS: I need to know what the historical reasons were for the
difference between the criteria for lawyers' special projects and CTR
special projects ....
JACOB: When we started the CTR Special Projects, the idea was that
the scientific director of CTR would review a project. If he liked it, it
was a CTR special project. If he did not like it, then it became a law-
yers' special project ....
STEVENS: ....
JACOB: [W]e were afraid of discovery for FTC and Aviado, we wanted
to protect it under the lawyers. We did not want it out in the open.
Id. at 14.
Another document entitled "Notes from the September 10, 1981 Meeting of
Company Counsel and Ad Hoc Committee Members" reads as follows:
E.J.: Difference between CTR and Special Four (lawyers' projects). Di-
rector of CTR reviews special projects-project was problem for CTR,
use Special Four. Also, if there are work-product claims, need the law-
yers' protection, e.g., CTR's past director, Bill Gardiner, didn't think
much of Rowe's work; Special Four financed him and he is now pub-
lished, e.g., motivational research that was done during the FTC inves-
tigation was done through Special Four because of possibility that CTR
would be subpoenaed. e.g., Joe Janus' current study of cohort effect
(those born in 1890-1910) is a full CTR project-Special Four gave in-
terim support.
Id. at 15.
12. See Beverly L. Jacklin, Federal Pre-Emption of State Common-Law
Products Liability Claims Pertaining to Tobacco Products, 97 A.L.R. FED 890
(1992). Claims leveled at the tobacco industry range from strict products liabil-
ity, to fraudulent misrepresentation, to breach of express and implied war-
ranty. Id.
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the tobacco industry under various theories.13  Despite the
fact that an estimated 434,000 people die each year due to
smoking related diseases,14 the tobacco industry has yet to
pay out a single dime in judgment or settlement.1 5 The diffi-
culty these plaintiffs have had is attributable to the inade-
quacies of certain tort theories in providing redress in tobacco
related cases 16 and the barriers imposed against these claims
by state1 7 and federal statutes.'8
13. Id.
14. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SMOKING-ATTRIBUTABLE MORTALITY
AND YEARS OF POTENTIAL LIFE LOST-UNITED STATES (1991).
15. See Paul G. Crist & John M. Majoras, The "New" Wave in Smoking and
Health Litigation-Is Anything Really So New?, 54 TENN. L. REV. 551, 552
(1987) (commenting that none of the tobacco related law suits brought in the
1950's and 1960's were resolved adversely to the manufacturer); Nightline with
Ted Koppel (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 1993). In this broadcast former
director of the CTR indicated that the tobacco industry has yet to pay any mon-
etary amount in judgments or settlements for tobacco-related lawsuits. Id.
16. For example, it is difficult to succeed against the tobacco industry under
tort theories that require a plaintiff to show that she was reasonable in relying
upon the tobacco manufacturers' misrepresentations about the health effects of
tobacco use. This is due to the fact that members of the general public are
generally well aware of the deleterious health effects of tobacco use. See Crist &
Majoras, supra note 15; see also infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
17. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 (West Supp. 1995) (precluding "product
liability" action for death or injury caused by tobacco products); see also Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. v. Superior Ct., 255 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Ct. App. 1989) (interpreting
California Civil Code section 1714.45 as immunizing the American Tobacco Co.
from liability for injuries attributable to the use of its tobacco products).
More specifically, the text of California Civil Code section 1714.45 reads as
follows:
(a) In a product liability action, a manufacturer or seller shall not be
liable if.
(1) The product is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be
unsafe by the ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community; and
(2) The product is a common consumer product intended for personal
consumption, such as sugar, caster oil, alcohol, tobacco, and butter, as
identified in comment i to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term "product liability action"
means any action for injury or death caused by a product, except that
the term does not include an action based on a manufacturing defect or
breach of an express warranty.
(c) This section is intended to be declarative of and does not alter or
amend existing California law, including Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
(1972) 8 Cal. 3d 121 [501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972)], and shall apply to all
product liability actions pending on, or commenced after, January 1,
1988.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 (West Supp. 1995).
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In light of the disappointing results obtained under these
"traditional" claims, this article will focus on a non-tradi-
tional claim that can be brought against the tobacco industry,
an action based on section 17200 and other related sections of
the California Business and Professions Code. 19 In assessing
the legal feasibility of bringing such a claim against the to-
bacco industry,20 this article will analyze the current
Supreme Court decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.21
to determine whether federal law preempts such claims.22
Lastly, this article will analyze the tactical advantages and
drawbacks of this claim in its application against the tobacco
industry.23
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
Sections 17200 through 1720524 collectively embody the
re-codification of the former California Civil Code section
3369.25 These sections are commonly referred to as the "Un-
fair Competition Act." Until 1962, they were more or less ap-
18. See infra notes 56-84 and accompanying text (discussing the preemp-
tive scope of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1334) (1988).
19. California Civil Code section 1714.45 does not seem to preclude claims
brought under California Business and Professions Code sections 17200-17500
because these claims are not "product liability action[s]" as defined by Califor-
nia Civil Code section 1714.45(b). CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 (West Supp. 1995).
More specifically, claims brought under California Business and Professions
Code sections 17200-17500 are not "action[s] for injury or death" caused by to-
bacco products, but are claims seeking redress for acts of unfair competition by
the tobacco product manufacturers. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200-17500
(West Supp. 1994). In fact, a plaintiff suing under California Business and Pro-
fessions Code sections 17200-17500 need not allege actual injuriies from defend-
ant's conduct. Id.; see infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
20. The scope of this article is limited to analyzing claims that can be
brought by private plaintiffs under California Business and Professions Code
sections 17200-17500. This article will not discuss claims that can also be
brought by public law enforcement agencies under these sections. Further, this
article will not discuss other tort claims that have traditionally been brought
against the tobacco industry, except where the discussion is necessary to de-
velop fully the claims that can be brought by private plaintiffs under sections
17200-17500.
21. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 56-114.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 115-34.
24. All future statutory references are to the California Business and Pro-
fessions Code, unless otherwise specified.
25. Wesley J. Howard, Former Civil Code Section 3369: A Study in Judicial
Interpretation, 30 HAST. L. J. 705, 726 (1979).
Applicable parts of the former California Civil Code section 3369 read as
follows:
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plied strictly to name infringement cases.26 However, since
the case of People ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co.,27 the
scope of the Unfair Competition Act has been extended to
"any 'unlawful, unfair or (deceptive) business practice'.., in
whatever context such activity might occur."
21
To bring an unfair competition claim, a plaintiff needs to
show that the defendant engaged in "unfair competition."29
Section 17200 defines "unfair competition" to include:
[Any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or prac-
tice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertis-
ing and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing
with section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business
and Professions Code.30
2. Any person performing or proposing to perform an act of unfair
competition within this state may be enjoined in any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.
3. As used in this section, unfair competition shall mean and include
(unlawful) unfair or fraudulent business practice and unfair, untrue,
(deceptive) or misleading advertising and any act denounced by Penal
Code Sections 654a, b, or c.
5. Actions for injunctions under this section may be prosecuted by...
any person acting for the interests of itself, its members, or the general
public.
Id. at 705-06 (citing Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 953, § 1, at 2482, as amended by Cal.
Stat. 1963, ch. 1606, § 1, at 3184 (parenthetical words added in 1963)).
26. Id. at 712-19; see also Bank of the West v. Superior Ct., 833 P.2d 545,
550 (Cal. 1992). The court explained that "[t]he common law tort of unfair com-
petition is generally thought to be synonymous with the act of passing off one's
goods as those of another." Id. at 551.
27. 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Ct. App. 1962).
28. Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn., 496 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1972) (em-
phasis added). The Barquis court employed the Unfair Competition Act to en-
join a collection agency from knowingly and willfully filing collection actions in
improper counties for the purpose of hindering the debtors' defense. Id. at 819,
828-31.
Since Barquis, California courts have adopted an expansive definition of
"unfair competition" and have applied the Unfair Competition Act to various
types of conduct outside of the name infringement context. A review of these
cases illustrates the broad range of conduct subject to the Unfair Competition
Act, including giving redress for unauthorized duplication of music records and
for improper towing and impounding of parked cars. See, e.g., Capitol Records,
Inc. v. Erickson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Ct. App. 1969) (enjoining defendant from
making "pirate" copies of records sold by the plaintiffs and selling the inferior
copies to the public at reduced prices); People v. James, 177 Cal. Rptr. 110 (Ct.
App. 1981) (enjoining liquor store owner and tow service operator from towing
and impounding cars from the liquor store's parking lot without proper warning
signs).
29. Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co., 164 Cal. Rptr. 279, 284 (Ct. App.
1980).
30. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West Supp. 1995).
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Thus, a plaintiff suing under this statute must demonstrate
that the defendant engaged in: (1) a business act or practice
that is unlawful, unfair or fraudulent;3 1 (2) advertising that
is unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading;32 or (3) an act that
is prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500)
of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code. 3
A. The First Prong of Section 17200
Under the first prong of section 17200 of the Business
and Professions Code, any "business practice" that is "unlaw-
ful" falls within the definition of "unfair competition."34
Thus, any business practice that violates other statutory laws
is actionable under section 17200.31 To bring an unfair com-
petition claim based on the first prong of section 17200, a
plaintiff must allege and establish all requisite elements
which constitute a violation of the underlying statute.36
31. Hereinafter referred to as the "first prong" of the Unfair Competition
Act.
32. Hereinafter referred to as the "second prong" of the Unfair Competition
Act.
33. Hereinafter referred to as the "third prong" of the Unfair Competition
Act.
Section 17500 is the only relevant section in Chapter 1, Part 3, Division 7 of
the California Business and Professions Code.
34. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West Supp. 1995).
35. Examples of unlawful business practices that are actionable under the
first prong of section 17200 include: assisting in the operation of a brothel in
violation of the RED LIGHT ABATEMENT LAw, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11225-11235
(West 1992), People v. Louden, 196 Cal. Rptr. 582 (Ct. App. 1983); possessing
and distributing obscene matters in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2 (West
1988), People v. E.W.A.P., Inc., 165 Cal. Rptr. 73, 74-75 (Ct. App. 1980); and
improperly operating a mobile home park in violation of the MOBILEHOME
PARKS ACT, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 18200-18700 (West 1992), People v.
McKale, 602 P.2d 731, 733 (Cal. 1979). Further, business practices that violate
section 17500 would also seem to violate the first prong of section 17200, as well
as the third prong of section 17200.
36. The point is illustrated in E.W.A.P. where the State of California
brought an unfair competition claim against the defendants for possessing ob-
scene material for the purposes of distribution. E. W.A.P., 165 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
The State's claim rested on the assertion that the defendants' possession of the
obscene matter for distribution violated California Penal Code section 311.2
which proscribed a person from "knowingly... possess[ing]... with intent to
distribute... any obscene matter ..... Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2
(West 1988)) (emphasis added). The court in E. WA.P. made clear that,
[since] the People's theory in this case is that defendant's business
practices are unlawful because they violate Penal Code section 311.2,
[in order for the People] to establish that defendants' conduct comes
within section 17200 the People would have to prove [every element of
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Thus, because analysis of the first prong of section 17200 is
specific to the particular underlying statute, this discussion
will be limited to this threshold analysis.
B. The Second and Third Prongs of Section 17200
Courts have interpreted section 17500 and the second
prong of section 17200 of the California Business and Profes-
sions Code to be synonymous despite differences in the statu-
tory language. 7 Both of these provisions are violated if
the underlying statutory violation and show] that defendants 'know-
ingly' distributed or possessed for distribution obscene matter.
Id. at 77 (emphasis added) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2 (West 1988)).
There is one exception to this rule in that the plaintiff need not show that
she would have had standing to sue directly through the underlying statute.
Instead, the plaintiff derives her standing to bring an unfair competition claim
under section 17204. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West Supp. 1995)
("[aictions for any relief pursuant to this chapter shall be prosecuted... by any
person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public.").
Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing v. Westwood Investors, 271 Cal. Rptr.
99 (Ct. App. 1990), is illustrative. In this case, a consumer protection organiza-
tion brought a section 17200 claim alleging that the defendants violated the
provisions of the Unruh Act. Id. at 100. The plaintiff was not an injured party
and thus did not have standing to sue directly under the Unruh Act. Id. Never-
theless, the court held that the plaintiff derived its standing to bring the unfair
competition claim under section 17204, independent of the Unruh Act. Id. at
107.
37. The differences in the language of these two sections are considerable.
For example, the second prong of section 17200 proscribes "unfair, deceptive,
untrue, or misleading advertising." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West
Supp. 1995). Section 17500 proscribes any person from disseminating any un-
true or misleading statement, by any means, about personal property, real
property or service, with the intent to sell such personal property, real property
or service. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 1987). Further, section
17500 is violated only if the defendant should have known her statement was
untrue or misleading with the exercise of reasonable care. Id. In sum, the two
statutes differ in that: (1) section 17200 proscribes unfair or deceptive adver-
tisements as well as untrue or misleading advertisements, whereas section
17500 applies literally only to untrue or misleading statements; (2) section
17200 applies only to advertisements, whereas section 17500 applies to any
statement; (3) section 17500 is violated only if the defendant made the state-
ment with the intent to dispose of property, perform service or to induce the
public to enter into an obligation; and (4) section 17500 is violated only if the
defendant should have known that the statement is untrue or misleading with
the exercise of reasonable care. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 1987).
Upon closer examination, however, to a certain extent the differences seem
linguistic rather than substantive. For example, the requirement in section
17500 that the "Statement" be made "with [the] intent [to] directly or indirectly
... dispose of real or personal property or to perform services ... or to induce
the public to enter into any obligation relating thereto" may be synonymous
with the requirement in section 17200 that the misrepresentation complained
of constitute an "advertisement." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West Supp.
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"members of the public are likely to be deceived" by the de-
fendant's advertisements.3 8 Surprisingly, no reported case
has yet defined the terms "unfair," "deceptive," "untrue," or
"misleading" specifically within the context of unfair competi-
tion claims. Instead, courts have defined the term "unfair
competition" generically. For example, the court in People ex
rel. Mosk. v. National Research Co.39 noted:
"Unfair competition" and "unfair or fraudulent busi-
ness practice," are generic terms. Like the terms "nui-
sance" or "negligence" they must be translated into spe-
cific situations of fact in order to be cognizable ...
"[U]nfair or fraudulent business practice" under any given
set of circumstances is a question of fact, the essential test
being whether the public is likely to be deceived.4"
The generic manner in which the courts have defined unfair
competition leaves open the question whether the Unfair
Competition Act encompasses the aforementioned conduct
engaged in by the tobacco industry. Because the touchstone
of the second and third prongs of the Unfair Competition Act
is whether "members of the public are likely to be deceived,"
it is unclear whether an "unfair," "deceptive," or "untrue" ad-
vertisement that is unlikely to deceive the public constitutes
a violation of the Unfair Competition Act.4
C. Reasonable Reliance
It is indeed conceivable to imagine a false statement that
is unlikely to deceive the public. For example, members of
1995). In fact, the definition of the term "advertisement" is a "call[ing of] public
attention to things for sale." WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTION.
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED 2 (1994).
Notwithstanding the foregoing and case law that treats sections 17200 and
17500 as synonymous, it is difficult to reconcile the statutory language with this
conclusion. Specifically, it is difficult to reconcile, (a) the fact that section 17200
proscribes "unfair [or] deceptive" advertisements as well as "untrue or mislead-
ing" advertisements, while section 17500 applies literally only to "untrue or
misleading" statements; and (b) that section 17500 is violated only if the de-
fendant should have known that the statement is untrue or misleading with the
exercise of reasonable care. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17500 (West
1987 & Supp. 1995).
38. Chern v. Bank of America, 544 P.2d 1310, 1316 (Cal. 1976).
39. 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Ct. App. 1962).
40. Id. at 521 (quoting Grant v. California Bench Co., 173 P.2d 817 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1946)).
41. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West Supp. 1995); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 1987).
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the public are unlikely to be deceived by false statements that
are patently unreliable. Thus, defining unfair competition as
an advertisement that is likely to deceive the public seems to
incorporate a standard of reasonable reliance. Taken liter-
ally, this standard appears to deny redress to plaintiffs who
actually rely on obviously unreliable misrepresentations.4 2
Imposition of a reasonable reliance standard may be fa-
tal to an unfair competition claim brought against the tobacco
industry. Arguably, the misrepresentations made by the to-
bacco industry through the CTR are so patently unreliable
they are unlikely to mislead a reasonable person and, there-
fore, do not constitute "unfair competition." More specifically,
the tobacco industry's promotion of the CTR as an independ-
ent organization may be inherently unreliable because of the
CTR's financial ties with the tobacco industry.43 In addition,
any assertions made by the CTR disclaiming a link between
smoking and health may be unreliable not only because of its
financial affiliation with the tobacco industry but, more im-
42. Notwithstanding the assumption that the judicial definition of unfair
competition incorporates a standard of reasonable reliance, courts have never-
theless failed to clearly define this standard. Given that a plaintiff suing under
the Unfair Competition Act need not allege personal reliance on the misrepre-
sentation or that she was injured thereby, the reasonableness standard must
necessarily be an objective one. Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v.
General Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 668 (Cal. 1983) (noting that unlike a claim
based on the "tort of fraud," "allegations of actual deception ... are unneces-
sary'" to state a cause of action under section 17200 (emphasis added)). Fur-
ther, in the case of tobacco litigation, the objective reasonable person appears to
be a smoker, given that the California Supreme Court has defined the applica-
ble standard to be whether a member of the "general public with whom defend-
ant deals" is likely to be deceived. Cher'n, 544 P.2d at 1316 (emphasis added).
On the other hand, it can be argued that the tobacco industry "deals with" non-
smokers who are considering whether or not to smoke. Either way, this clarifi-
cation does not seem helpful given that smokers are comprised of a general
cross section of society. A more helpful standard can be gleaned from the deci-
sion in Chern. In Chern, the California Supreme Court found that the defend-
ant bank's practice of quoting "per annum" interest rate to its customers was
misleading despite the fact that such practice was "customary ... within the
banking community" and borrowers could have easily discovered the discrep-
ancy between quoted rate and the actual rate charged. Id. A "per annum" rate
of interest is calculated based on a 360 day year but actual rate of interest
charged is calculated based on the actual number of days in a particular year
which is either 365 or 366 days. Id. at 1312. The former rate is slightly lower
than the latter rate. Thus, by analogy, it appears that the objective "reason-
able" person need not be a person who is particularly well informed nor inquisi-
tive about the health hazards of smoking.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
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portantly, because of the general public's awareness of the
deleterious health effects of smoking.44
To be sure, the majority of the population, including mil-
lions of smokers, either knows that smoking is hazardous to
health or is aware of evidence indicating this fact.45 There
are literally thousands of publications, songs, poems,
cartoons, movies, and other forms of mass media that warn
the general public of the hazards of smoking.46 Furthermore,
virtually every state school system has adopted some form of
curriculum addressing smoking and health issues.47 Lastly,
the California Legislature has codified the general public's
awareness that tobacco is an inherently unsafe product.48
Consequently, the viability of successfully asserting an unfair
competition claim against the tobacco industry appears to
hinge upon whether California courts adopt a restrictive defi-
nition of unfair competition and impose the reasonable reli-
ance standard upon the plaintiff.
The history behind the Act and recent decisions indicate
that the scope of the Unfair Competition Act will not be lim-
ited in this manner.49 In the past, California courts have
been reluctant to narrowly interpret the term "unfair compe-
tition." For example, the court in Athens Lodge v. Wilson5 °
stated that the language of the civil code, "unfair competi-
tion" and "shall mean and include," is not restrictive or
exclusive.5 '
Furthermore, California courts have long recognized sec-
tion 17200 as an equitable statute. For example, in ex-
tending the Unfair Competition Act beyond name infringe-
ment cases, the court in Academy of Motion Picture Arts and
Sciences v. Benson52 remarked:
When a scheme is evolved which on its face violates
the fundamental rules of honesty and fair dealing, a court
44. See infra text accompanying notes 45-48.
45. Crist & Majoras, supra note 15, at 558.
46. Id. at 553-60.
47. Id. at 557-58.
48. See supra note 17. The court innAmerican Tobacco Co. interpreted Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 1714.45 as codifying the fact that "ordinary consum-
ers" are aware that tobacco products are "inherently unsafe." American To-
bacco Co. v. Superior Ct., 255 Cal. Rptr. 280, 282-83 (Ct. App. 1989).
49. See infra notes 54, 139-145 and accompanying text.
50. 255 P.2d 482 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).
51. Id. at 484.
52. 104 P.2d 650 (Cal. 1940).
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of equity is not impotent to frustrate its consummation be-
cause the scheme is an original one. There is a maxim as
old as law that there can be no right without a remedy,
and in searching for a precise precedent, an equity court
must not lose sight, not only of its power, but of its duty to
arrive at a just solution of the problem. 53
Lastly, at least one recent decision has expressly indicated
that reasonable reliance is not a requisite element of an un-
fair competition claim.54
It appears that the tobacco industry engaged in nothing
less than an intentional scheme to deceive the public about
the truth concerning smoking and health. In response to this
intentional scheme, it is probable that courts will depart from
the traditional definition of unfair competition and interpret
the statutes as proscribing such conduct.55
III. PREEMPTION
The traditional definition of unfair competition5 6 poses
difficulty not only in establishing a prima facie case under the
Unfair Competition Act but also in escaping federal preemp-
tion under 15 U.S.C. sections 1331 through 1340, known as
the "Labeling Act."57 In 1965, Congress enacted the Labeling
Act in response to diverse laws that were proposed or enacted
to regulate cigarette labeling and advertisement.5 8 Congress
53. Id. at 653; see also Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn., 496 P.2d 817,
830 (Cal. 1972). The court noted that section 17200 "establishes only a wide
standard to guide courts of equity [and] ... given the creative nature of the
scheming mind, the Legislature evidently concluded that a less inclusive stan-
dard would not be adequate." Id.
54. See Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.,
673 P.2d 660 (Cal. 1983). The plaintiff in Children's brought suit based on the
Unfair Competition Act and on a common law fraudulent misrepresentation
theory. The court held that, unlike a claim based on the tort of fraud, "allega-
tions of actual deception, reasonable reliance, and damage are unnecessary" to
state a cause of action under the Unfair Competition Act. Id. at 668 (emphasis
added).
55. To be sure, such a judicial interpretation would not require an expan-
sion of the statute; courts can impose liability on the tobacco industry simply by
giving full effect to the language contained in the statute. More specifically, the
tobacco industry's conduct seems to fall squarely within the statutory definition
of unfair competition as a "deceptive [or] untrue... advertisement." See supra
text accompanying note 30 for the text of section 17200.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1988).
58. See 111 CONG. Rc. 13900-02 (1964) (statement of Sen. Moss); see also
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feared that diverse local and state regulations would create
chaotic conditions for the tobacco industry.59 Thus, Congress
expressly provided for preemption in this area.6 ° In so doing,
Congress made clear its desire to strike a balance between
the two conflicting interests: informing the public of the
hazards of tobacco products and protecting parts of the na-
tional economy dependent on the tobacco industry. 1
Because of its importance, the scope of the preemption
provision was actively disputed in tobacco litigation.62  The
resulting decisions left the area fraught with ambiguity and
conflict.63 To resolve the conflicts among the circuits and to
clarify this issue, the United States Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.64 Unfor-
tunately, the Court's decision fell short of the desired
clarification.
state and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 2nd. Sess.
4-5, 7-9, 11-12 (1964).
59. Id.
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 1334 which reads, in relevant part:
(1) no statement relating to smoking and health, other than the state-
ment required by section 4 of this Act [15 U.S.C. § 1333], shall be re-
quired on any cigarette package....
15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) which states:
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the
maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not im-
peded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and ad-
vertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking
and health.
15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). Section 1331 reads in relevant part, as
follows:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this Act, to establish
a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and
advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and
health, whereby-
(1) the public may be adequately informed about any adverse health
effects of cigarette smoking by inclusion of warning notices on each
package of cigarettes and in each advertisement of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the
maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not im-
peded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and ad-
vertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking
and health.
15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
62. For a general discussion, see Jacklin, supra note 12.
63. See id.
64. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
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In Cipollone, the petitioner sued the respondents alleg-
ing that she developed lung cancer because she smoked ciga-
rettes manufactured and sold by the defendants. 65 The peti-
tioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents were guilty of
fraudulent misrepresentation because they attempted to neu-
tralize the effect of federally mandated warning labels
through their promotional activities, and deprived the public
of medical and scientific data linking smoking to health dis-
eases. 66 The respondents challenged the petitioner's fraudu-
lent misrepresentation claims arguing that they were pre-
empted by the Labeling Act. 7
In a decision split three ways, the plurality's preemption
analysis included a caveat that when a Congressional enact-
ment expressly provides for preemption, the preemption
analysis is limited by the express language contained in that
provision.6 8 In other words, Congress' enactment of a provi-
sion defining the preemptive reach of a statute implies that
matters beyond that reach are not preempted.6 9 The Court
found Section 1334 of the Labeling Act, entitled "Preemp-
tion," to be such a provision.70 The section reads, in relevant
part, that "no statement relating to smoking and health,
other than the statement required by section 4 of this Act (15
U.S.C. section 1333), shall be required on any cigarette pack-
age."71 Focusing on the phrase "relating to smoking and
health," the plurality held that this provision preempts only
those claims that are predicated upon a "duty based on smok-
ing and health."
72
The plurality held that the petitioner's fraudulent mis-
representation claims, alleging that the respondents' adver-
tising neutralized the effect of federally mandated warning
labels, were preempted because such claims were predicated
upon a "duty based on smoking and health."73 However, the
65. Id. at 2614. The original lawsuit was brought by Rose Cipollone in
1983. Upon her death, her son maintained the lawsuit as the executor of her
estate. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2617.
69. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992).
70. Id. at 2618.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988).
72. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2623.
73. Id. at 2623. The plurality did not specifically state that such fraudulent
misrepresentation claims are predicated upon a "duty based on smoking and
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petitioner's fraudulent misrepresentation claim, alleging that
respondents made false representations and concealed mate-
rial facts about the deleterious health effects of smoking, was
saved from preemption because such a claim was based on a
"duty not to deceive" rather than a duty "based on smoking
and health."74
The plurality justified this interpretation by pointing out
that Congress did not indicate its desire to "insulate cigarette
manufacturers from [the] long-standing rules governing
fraud."75 Moreover, the Court reasoned that Congress' intent
to preserve state regulation of "deceptive advertising" can be
inferred from its decision to preserve the Federal Trade Com-
mission's authority to identify and punish deceptive tobacco
advertising. 76 Lastly, the plurality justified its interpretation
as "wholly consistent" with the legislative intent behind the
Labeling Act. 77 The plurality reasoned that state law prohi-
bition of intentional fraud does not create "'diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing' standards" because such claims
rely on a "single, uniform standard" of falsity.78
The plurality's opinion is confusing, inconsistent, and
possibly illogical. 79 Other than the specified fraudulent mis-
representation claim, it is difficult to determine from the plu-
rality's holding exactly what claims are predicated upon a
"duty based on smoking and health" and, thus, preempted.
Justice Scalia interprets the plurality's opinion to mean that
a claim is predicated upon a "duty based on smoking and
health." However, this can be inferred from the plurality's holding that claims
are not preempted unless predicated upon a "duty based on smoking and
health."
74. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2623-24 (1992).
75. Id. at 2624.
76. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1336 (1988)). 15 U.S.C. section 1336 reads as
follows: "Nothing in [the Labeling Act]... shall be construed to limit, restrict,
expand or otherwise affect the authority of the Federal Trade Commission with
respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the advertising of cigarettes."
77. Id. at 2624.
78. Id.
79. Two justices wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Blackmun was joined
by Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter in describing the plurality's opinion as
"creat[ing] a crazy quilt of preemption" and projecting that lower courts will
encounter difficulty in attempting to implement the plurality's decision. Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2631 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, blasted the
plurality's opinion with the statement that "a disposition that raises more ques-
tions than it answers does not serve the country well." Id. at 2638 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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health" if it arises under a law that is "specifically directed to
'smoking and health"' or is "uniquely crafted to address the
relationship between cigarette companies and their putative
victims.... "80 However, as Justice Scalia acknowledges, this
interpretation is inconsistent with the plurality's holding.
8 1
The inconsistency stems from the fact that the petitioner's
failure to warn claim is predicated upon a "duty based on
smoking and health" despite the fact that such a duty to warn
is imposed upon all commercial suppliers.82 Therefore, such
a claim is not "uniquely crafted" for smoking and health liti-
gation, nor is it "specifically directed" against the tobacco in-
dustry. Thus, to the extent that the plurality found the peti-
tioner's failure to warn claim to be predicated upon a "duty
based on smoking and health,"83 the dissent's interpretation
is invalid.
Another possible interpretation is that a claim is predi-
cated upon a "duty based on smoking and health" if it chal-
lenges the adequacy or sufficiency of the federally mandated
warning labels regarding the health risks of smoking, or chal-
lenges the adequacy of the labels in light of the defendant's
misrepresentations. This interpretation is consistent with
the plurality's holding that the petitioner's failure to warn
claim is preempted because such claim is predicated on the
assertion that the federally mandated warning labels are in-
sufficient and that additional or more clearly stated warnings
are necessary to "make [cigarettes] ... reasonably safe, suita-
ble and fit for its intended use .... " 4 Furthermore, this in-
terpretation is consistent with the plurality's holding that the
petitioner's fraudulent misrepresentation claim is preempted
to the extent the petitioner asserts that the respondents' pro-
motional activities negated the efficacy or sufficiency of the
federally mandated warnings.
Lastly, this interpretation may explain why the peti-
tioner's claim that respondents made false representations or
80. Id. at 2636.
81. Id. (referring to plurality's holding that petitioner's failure to warn
claim is preempted despite the fact that the common law duty to warn about a
product's danger was not "specifically crafted with an eye toward 'smoking and
health' ").
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2621-22.
84. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2621 (1992) (plurality's
characterization of the petitioner's failure to warn claim).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
concealed a material fact about the health hazards of tobacco
use is saved from preemption.8 5 This last claim does not
challenge the efficacy or sufficiency of the federally mandated
warning labels. Instead, this claim addresses only whether
the respondent's statement or omission constituted a misrep-
resentation, regardless of its effect on the efficacy of the feder-
ally mandated warning labels. This distinction becomes
more clear if we imagine a claim converse to those typically
found in tobacco litigation. For example, if a plaintiff were to
bring a fraudulent misrepresentation claim against an anti-
smoking organization for misrepresenting that smoking will
cause imminent death, such a claim does not seem to be
"based on smoking and health" since it does not challenge the
efficacy or sufficiency of the federally mandated warning.8 6
Instead, such a claim focuses only on the falsity or deceptive
nature of the defendant's statement or omission, albeit con-
cerning the subject matter of smoking and health.
Under this interpretation, an unfair competition claim
brought against the tobacco industry appears to be pre-
empted by the Labeling Act given that the litmus test for this
claim seems to be whether the "public is likely to be
deceived."8 7 More specifically, under this interpretation, an
unfair competition claim against the tobacco industry is via-
ble only if the members of the "public are likely to be
deceived" by the tobacco industry's misrepresentations de-
spite the federally mandated warning labels. In this respect,
an unfair competition claim is similar to the fraudulent mis-
representation claim in Cipollone that the tobacco industry's
promotional activities negated the efficacy or sufficiency of
the federally mandated warnings and, thus, is likewise
preempted. 88
However, it remains unclear whether the likelihood of
public deception is an indispensable element of an unfair
competition claim. A strong argument can be made that an
unfair competition claim can be stated to provide redress for
unfair, deceptive, or untrue advertising practices without re-
gard to their ultimate misleading effect on the public; 9 and
85. Id. at 2613.
86. See id. at 2621.
87. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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that it is, therefore not preempted as being based on smoking
and health.90 However, given the uncertainty in what consti-
tutes a "duty based on smoking and health,"91 it may be more
useful to attack the preemption problem by analogy. More
specifically, a plaintiff may argue that an unfair competition
claim is analogous to Cipollone's common law fraud claim al-
leging that the tobacco industry made false representations
or concealed a material fact and, therefore, is likewise saved
from preemption.
The analogy between the two claims is far from perfect.
First, the elements required to establish an unfair competi-
tion claim are markedly different from the elements required
to establish a common law fraudulent misrepresentation
claim. To establish a common law fraud claim, the plaintiff
must show the following: (1) the defendant made a represen-
tation to a past or existing material fact; (2) the representa-
tion must have been false; (3) the defendant knew the repre-
sentation was false; (4) the defendant intended for the
plaintiff to rely on the representation; (5) the plaintiff must
have been unaware of the falsity; (6) the plaintiff must have
had reasonable reliance on the truth of the representation;
and (7) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of such
reliance.9 2
In contrast, far fewer elements are required to establish
an unfair competition claim based on the second and third
prongs of section 17200. An unfair competition claim can be
established if the plaintiff shows that members of the public
are "likely to be deceived."93 A plaintiff need not allege or
90. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2621 (1992).
91. Id.
92. BAJI No. 12.31 (1991); see also 5 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW
§ 676 (9th ed. 1988); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1709 (West 1987); Hobart v. Hobart Es-
tate Co., 159 P.2d 958, 964 (Cal. 1945). The court in Hobart stated:
In general, to establish a cause of action for fraud or deceit plaintiff
must prove that a material representation was made; that it was false;
that defendants knew it to be untrue or did not have sufficient knowl-
edge to warrant a belief that it was true; that it was made with an
intent to induce plaintiff to act in reliance thereon; that plaintiff rea-
sonably believed it to be true; that it was relied on by plaintiff; and that
plaintiff suffered damage thereby.
Id. at 964.
93. Bank of the West v. Superior Ct., 833 P.2d 545, 553 (Cal. 1992). The
court in Bank of the West explained:
In drafting the [Unfair Competition A]ct, the Legislature deliberately
traded the attributes of tort law for speed and administrative simplic-
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show that she actually relied on the misrepresentation9 4 or
that she suffered damages as a result thereof.95 In fact, a
claim based on the Unfair Competition Act can be sustained
even if no one actually suffered harm.96 Lastly, unlike the
fraudulent misrepresentation claim, the wrongdoer's intent
may be irrelevant under an unfair competition claim.97
ity. As a result, to state a claim under the [Aict one need not plead and
prove the elements of a tort. Instead, one need only show that "mem-
bers of the public are likely to be deceived."
Id. (citing Chern v. Bank of America, 544 P.2d 1310, 1316 (Cal. 1976)).
94. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. More specifically, the court
in Children's stated that, unlike a claim based on the tort of fraud, allegations
of actual deception, reasonable reliance, and damage are unnecessary to state a
cause of action under the Unfair Competition Act. Committee on Children's
Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 668 (Cal. 1983).
95. See supra note 36; Children's, 673 P.2d at 671. The California Supreme
Court allowed an organizational plaintiff to bring an unfair competition claim
against a children's breakfast cereal manufacturer, despite the fact that the
"organizational plaintiffs [admittedly] suffered no legal cognizable damages
under any cause of action." Id.; see also Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co., 164
Cal. Rptr. 279, 283-84 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding a private plaintiff may bring an
unfair competition claim against an automobile dealer and a lending institution
for violating the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act despite the fact
that the plaintiff did not purchase an automobile from one of the defendants
and neither borrowed nor attempted to borrow money from the other defend-
ant); but see Stoiber v. Honeychuck, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194, 207 (Ct. App. 1980). In
Stoiber, the court held that a former tenant of rental premises did not have
standing to bring an unfair competition claim against her former landlord for
unlawfully failing to keep the rental premises in habitable condition because
she was no longer "in possession of any of the properties owned or managed by
the defendants" and had "no need of or standing to seek an injunction [under
the Unfair Competition Act] on her own behalf." Id. at 207. The court went on
to point out, however, that the "appellant ha[d] failed to allege that she is suing
on behalf of the general public," thereby implying that such an allegation may
have cured the plaintiff's defect in standing. Id. at 207.
96. In Children's, the court also concluded that an unfair competition claim
can be sustained, and injunctive relief awarded, even if no one was actually
injured because the plaintiff is only required to show that "members of the pub-
lic are likely to be deceived." Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen-
eral Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 668 (Cal. 1983) (citing Payne v. United Califor-
nia Bank, 100 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Ct. App. 1972)); Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High
Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551, 554-55 (9th Cir. 1960)). See also supra
note 93; Chern v. Bank of America, 544 P.2d 1310, 1316 (Cal. 1976). In Chern,
the court allowed an unfair competition claim against a bank for misquoting the
interest rate charged on loans despite the fact that the plaintiff was fully aware
of the actual interest rate charged when she entered into the loan agreement
with the defendant. Id. at 1316. The court in Chern also recognized that the
Unfair Competition Act "affords protection against the probability or likelihood
as well as the actuality of deception." Id.
97. There is no reported case directly on point. However, the fact that the
Unfair Competition Act does not specify a scienter requirement is probative. It
has long been accepted that "[where] qualifying words such as knowingly, in-
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These differences are not necessarily fatal. Although the
Cippolone plurality made specific reference to the long stand-
ing rule governing fraud, the plurality did not indicate that
only common law fraud claims were saved from preemption.
9 8
Rather, the reference to common law fraud claims seems
merely exemplary. Indeed, the plurality based its holding on
the particular attributes of the petitioner's common law fraud
claim.99 The plurality emphasized that the petitioner's
fraudulent misrepresentation claim was saved from preemp-
tion because it was based on a "duty not to deceive" and on a
"single uniform standard of falsity."100 An unfair competition
claim appears to possess these attributes as well. In fact, the
statutory definition of "unfair competition" includes false and
deceptive advertisements and statements. 10 1 Furthermore,
because sections 17200 and 17500 expressly proscribe "un-
true" advertising or statements, 10 2 it can be argued that un-
fair competition claims are also based on a "single uniform
standard [of] falsity."
However, the traditional interpretation of the Unfair
Competition Act as proscribing advertisements that are
"likely to deceive" the public poses a problem in drawing an
analogy. 10 3 The scope of "misleading" advertisements ap-
pears to be both broader and narrower than "false or decep-
tentionally, or fraudulently, are omitted from provisions creating the offense it
is held that guilty knowledge and intent are not elements of the offense ...."
People v. Regan, 157 Cal. Rptr. 62, 64 (Ct. App. 1979). Further, California
courts have traditionally imposed strict liability where a particular statute is
designed to protect the public from "fraudulent conduct for which most mem-
bers of the public are helpless to protect themselves." Id. at 64. Thus, given the
lack of "qualifying words" in the Unfair Competition Act and given that the
statute has long been recognized as a consumer protection provision, it is rea-
sonable to assume that scienter is not a requisite element of an unfair competi-
tion claim. See, e.g., Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn., 496 P.2d 817, 828-
30 (Cal. 1972) (indicating that the Unfair Competition Act demonstrates a clear
design to protect consumers); People ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co., 20
Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 (Ct. App. 1962) (holding that section 17200 and its predeces-
sor California Civil Code section 3369 are designed to protect the right of the
public from fraud and deceit).
98. Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2625 (1992) (holding
that the Labeling Act did "not preempt petitioner's express warranty and con-
spiracy claims as well as petitioner's fraudulent misrepresentation claim").
99. Id. at 2623-24.
100. Id.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
102. See supra text accompanying note 37.
103. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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tive" misrepresentations. The scope of an unfair competition
claim is narrower in that such a claim may not lie against
advertisements that are clearly false and thus, are unlikely
to mislead the public.10 4 On the other hand, an unfair compe-
tition claim can be stated against factually true advertise-
ments that are, nevertheless, likely to mislead the public.10 5
This defect, however, seems curable if the plaintiff specifi-
cally alleges and shows that the conduct complained of under
the Unfair Competition Act is also "false" or "deceptive."
One possibly incurable defect in the unfair competition
claim is that it may create "'diverse, nonuniform, and confus-
ing' standards" among the states in direct contravention of
the Labeling Act's purpose. 1 0 6 This is attributable to the fact
that not all states have enacted statutes similar to the Unfair
Competition Act. Furthermore, even those that have enacted
similar consumer protection statutes may not necessarily in-
terpret the statutes in a comparable manner. Lastly, the am-
biguous fashion in which California courts have defined the
term "unfair competition " 1° 7 may lead to the creation of
nonuniform standards within California, in addition to the
diversity among the states.
Notwithstanding the purpose of the Labeling Act, com-
plete uniformity does not appear to be a requirement under
the plurality's holding. The plurality allowed the petitioner's
fraudulent misrepresentation claim even though the question
of whether a statement or omission constitutes a misrepre-
sentation "would almost certainly [be] answered differently
from state to state."'0 8 Further, this defect may be cured if
the plaintiff can show the defendant's misleading misrepre-
sentations were untrue because then the claim, arguably, is
based on a "single uniform standard of falsity."'0 9
Whether the unfair competition claim is preempted by
the Labeling Act is left unclear because of the plurality's fail-
ure to adequately explain what duties are "based on smoking
and health."" 0 Further, the failure of the California courts'
104. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text,
106. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
107. Id.; see also supra notes 42-55.
108. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2636 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
109. Id. at 2624.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 69-84.
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to clearly define the scope of an unfair competition claim'1 '
and the fact that an unfair competition claim is significantly
different from a common law fraudulent misrepresentation
claim"1 2 poses problems with respect to the preemption issue.
Nevertheless, the Cipollone plurality opinion serves as a
helpful guide in bringing an unfair competition claim against
the tobacco industry. Given that the plurality placed impor-
tance on the fact that the petitioner's common law fraudulent
misrepresentation claims were based on allegations of "de-
ception" and the standard of "falsity,"113 it would appear pru-
dent to tailor the unfair competition claim to specifically al-
lege that the CTR's misrepresentations were both deceptive
and false. Furthermore, given the holding in Cipollone that a
fraudulent misrepresentation claim is preempted to the ex-
tent that it asserts that the efficacy or the sufficiency of the
federally mandated warnings is negated, 1 4 it may be advisa-
ble to steer away from such allegations with respect to the
unfair competition claim.
IV. PROS AND CONS OF THE UNFAIR COMPETITION CLAIM
Bringing an unfair competition claim has its advantages
and drawbacks. The most important advantage is that fewer
elements are required to establish an unfair competition
claim than are required to establish a common law fraudu-
lent misrepresentation claim." 5 Because a plaintiff need not
allege that she actually relied on any particular misrepresen-
tation made by the CTR,1 6 all evidence of the CTR's scheme
to mislead the general public about smoking and health is
relevant for discovery and for presentation to the fact finder
at trial.
In contrast, under a fraudulent misrepresentation claim,
only those misrepresentations upon which a particular plain-
tiff relied are relevant for discovery and trial. Further, be-
cause, in a unfair competition claim, a plaintiff need not al-
lege actual damages caused by reliance on a particular
111. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
114. Cipolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2623 (1992).
115. See supra notes 42, 50-55, 94-97 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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misrepresentation, 1 17 a plaintiff would not be subject to the
onerous and possibly embarrassing discovery sought by the
tobacco industry in an attempt to negate either the actual re-
liance or causation elements."" Also, given that the unfair
competition claim can be sustained even if no one actually
suffered damages,"1 9 a plaintiff bringing an unfair competi-
tion claim on behalf of the general public under section 17204
would not be constrained by the particular factual circum-
stances or goals of the representative plaintiff. Such a repre-
sentative plaintiff would be required in order to bring a suit
under the common law fraudulent misrepresentation theory.
Lastly, unlike the common law fraud claim, reasonable reli-
ance may not be a requisite element of an unfair competition
claim.120 If this is the case, a plaintiff bringing an unfair
competition claim would have a tremendous advantage in not
having to show it was reasonable to rely on the CTR's misrep-
resentations despite the CTR's financial affiliation with the
tobacco industry' 2 ' and despite the general public's actual
and imputed awareness about the deleterious effects of
smoking. 122
In terms of disadvantages, however, the limited remedies
available under the Unfair Competition Act are a considera-
ble drawback. The only remedies permitted under the Unfair
Competition Act are injunctive and restitutionary relief.
123
Compensatory damages are not allowed in an unfair competi-
117. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
118. Nightline with Ted Koppel, supra note 15. An interview with a former
director of the CTR revealed that the tobacco industry used onerous and embar-
rassing discovery tactics under the guise of negating the actual causation and
justifiable reliance elements to discourage plaintiffs from maintaining their
suits against the tobacco industry. Id.
119. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 42, 50-55 and accompanying text.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6, 43.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
123. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17203, 17535 (West Supp. 1995). Sec-
tion 17203 provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair
competition may be enjoined.... The court may make such orders or
judgments... as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment
by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair competition...
or as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money
or property... which may have been acquired by means of such unfair
competition.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West Supp. 1995). Section 17535 states, in
relevant part:
[Vol. 35216
19941 CALIFORNIA'S UNFAIR COMPETITION ACT 217
tion claim. 124 Further, because punitive damages are inci-
dent to actual damages, they are not permitted under an un-
fair competition claim. 125 Lastly, although a private plaintiff
suing on behalf of the public may be able to recover attorney's
fees under California Code of Civil Procedure section
1021.5,126 attorney's fees are not explicitly authorized by the
Unfair Competition Act for violations of sections 17200 or
17500.127
Thus, the only significant monetary recovery allowed
under the Unfair Competition Act would be based on restitu-
tion. Exactly how much money can be recovered under the
Any person... [who] violates or proposes to violate this chapter may
be enjoined .... The court may make such orders or judgments, includ-
ing the appointment of a receiver, as may be necessary to prevent the
use or employment by any person... which violate[s] this chapter, or
which may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money
or property... which may have been acquired by means of any practice
in this chapter declared to be unlawful.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17535 (West 1987).
124. See Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 814
P.2d 704, 706, 714 (Cal. 1991) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior
Ct., 259 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Ct. App. 1989)); see also Bank of the West v. Superior
Ct., 833 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992) (explicitly overruling United Farm Workers of
America v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. Rptr. 904 (Ct. App. 1975), the only Califor-
nia case that allowed compensatory damages under the Unfair Competition
Act).
The court in Dean Witter explained that:
[tihe exclusion of claims for compensatory damages is also consistent
with the overarching legislative concern to provide a streamlined pro-
cedure for the prevention of ongoing threatened acts of unfair competi-
tion. To permit individual claims for compensatory damages to be pur-
sued as part of such a procedure would tend to thwart this objective by
requiring the court to deal with a variety of damage issues of higher
order of complexity.
Dean Witter, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
125. See Jackson v. Johnson, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 482, 491 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing
Clark v. McClurg, 9 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1932)); Haydel v. Morton, 48 P.2d 709 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1935); Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 197 P.2d 713, 720 (Cal. 1948).
126. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1021.5 (West Supp. 1995). For a general discus-
sion on recovering attorneys' fees under CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 1021.5 in the
context of unfair competition claims, see Committee to Defend Reproductive
Rights v. Free Pregnancy Center, 280 Cal. Rptr. 329 (Ct. App. 1991), and
Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing v. Westwood Investors, 271 Cal. Rptr.
99, 102 n.3 (Ct. App. 1990).
127. See California Service Station and Automotive Repair Assn. v. Union
Oil Co. of California, 283 Cal. Rptr. 279, 286 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Pachmayr
Gun Works, Inc. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 802, 809-12 (9th Cir.
1974)). Section 17082 is the only section in the California Business and Profes-
sions Code that provides for attorneys' fees and applies only to claims of price
discrimination, secret rebates and loss selling.
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restitutionary remedy is unclear. Under the statute, the
amount of money to be restored appears to be linked to the
amount of benefit that the defendant derived from engaging
in the proscribed conduct. 128  However, the California
Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Security Pacific National
Bank 29 has made clear that the restitutionary remedy is not
necessarily dependent upon or limited by the amount of bene-
fits that was conferred upon the defendants due to their un-
lawful conduct.1 30 Instead, the Court interpreted the Unfair
Competition Act as allowing courts to fix a restitutionary
amount that is "necessary 'to prevent the use or employment'
of unfair practices."1 3 '
It is unclear what amount of restitution is necessary to
deter the CTR and the tobacco industry from continuing their
misrepresentation scheme. Arguably, monetary restitution is
not necessary because a court order enjoining future use or
employment of unfair practices will serve as specific deter-
rence. On the other hand, general deterrence will not be
achieved if wrongdoers are allowed to retain the benefits of
their unlawful conduct. 132 Thus, the tobacco industry should
be required to disgorge an amount of money that is at least
equal to the benefits that it recognized through its misrepre-
sentation campaign.
128. See supra note 123. Section 17535 allows the court to order restitution
in "money or property ... which may have been acquired by means of any prac-
tice ... declared to be unlawful [under the Unfair Competition Act]." CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 17535 (West 1987).
129. 591 P.2d 51 (Cal. 1979).
130. Id. at 55-59.
131. Id. at 56. The court's holding dispensed with a need to show a direct
link between the proscribed act and the amount of money to be restored. This
holding was based on the court's interpretation of section 17535, as well as the
equitable power of the courts, to "accomplish complete justice between the par-
ties" through restitution even in the absence of a specific statutory provision.
Id.
132. Id. at 56.
[Through Business and Professions Code section 17535,] the Legisla-
ture obviously intended to vest the trial court with broad authority to
fashion a remedy that would effectively 'prevent the use . . . of any
practice which violate [the] Chapter [proscribing unfair trade prac-
tices]' and deter the defendant, and similar entities, from engaging in
such practices in the future. The requirement that a wrongdoing en-
tity disgorge improperly obtained money surely serves as the pre-
scribed strong deterrent.
Id. (emphasis added) (alterations in original).
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The latter approach does not simplify the matter much
because putting a dollar value on the benefits attained by the
tobacco industry through its misrepresentation campaign is a
daunting task. Not only is it difficult to accurately account
for all cigarette sales that are attributable to their misrepre-
sentation scheme, 133 but it is even more difficult to estimate
the value of the good-will derived through the misrepresenta-
tion. However, it can be argued that the tobacco industry
should bear the burden of establishing this element. Given
that the tobacco industry would not have established and sus-
tained the CTR for over 40 years13 4 unless doing so was prof-
itable, courts can presume that the value of benefits gained
by the misrepresentation is at least equal to the costs of
maintaining the CTR and other facets of the misrepresenta-
tion campaign. This presumption would allow for the possi-
bility that the CTR was not a profitable venture by shifting
the burden to the tobacco industry to establish such a de-
fense. This appears to be an equitable solution as the tobacco
industry is in a better position than the plaintiff to establish
these facts.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether an unfair competition claim can be successfully
asserted against the tobacco industry remains unclear due to
the loose manner in which California courts have interpreted
the Unfair Competition Act. 135 Furthermore, the United
States Supreme Court's failure to establish a clear and relia-
ble preemption standard leaves unanswered the question of
whether the unfair competition claim is preempted by the La-
beling Act. Even without these uncertainties, the unfair com-
petition claim is far from an ideal replacement for the more
traditional claims brought against the tobacco industry be-
cause it does not allow for compensatory nor punitive dam-
ages and because the amount of restitutionary damages that
can be recovered is uncertain.1 3 6 However, given that the un-
133. This would also erode some of the benefits of bringing an unfair compe-
tition claim because having to show a link between the CTR's misrepresenta-
tions and additional cigarette sales would be tantamount to requiring the plain-
tiff to establish actual causation.
134. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
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fair competition claim is a cumulative remedy 13 7 that re-
quires the plaintiff to show fewer elements than "traditional"
claims, such as the common law fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion claim, 138 a plaintiff should raise the unfair competition
claim in addition to other types of claims brought against the
tobacco industry.
VI. ADDENDUM
After this article was written, the California Supreme
Court decided the case of Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company. 1 39 The plaintiff in Mangini brought an unfair com-
petition action against the manufacturer of Camel cigarettes
to enjoin the defendant's use of a cartoon character for pro-
moting its cigarettes to minors, in violation of California Pe-
nal Code section 308, which proscribes the sale of tobacco
products to persons under the age of 18.140
The court of appeal in that case first addressed the issue
of whether the defendant's conduct constituted "unfair, de-
ceptive, untrue or misleading advertising," as proscribed by
California's Unfair Competition Act.141 The court of appeal
recognized that the purported exploitation of an inappropri-
ate audience of minors did not alone constitute deceptive, un-
true or misleading advertising. 142  Further, it noted that
there was no statutory definition of "unfair" advertising in
California law. 14 3 Thus, the court applied the Federal Trade
Commission's standard for determining whether particular
conduct that is not deceptive is nevertheless "unfair" under
137. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17205 (West 1987) ("Unless otherwise
expressly provided, the remedies or penalties provided by this chapter are cu-
mulative to each other and to the remedies and penalties available under all
other laws of the state.")
138. See supra notes 42, 50-55, 94-96 and accompanying text.
139. 875 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1994), aff'g 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 232 (Ct. App. 1993), cert.
denied 115 S. Ct. 577 (1994).
140. Id. at 78; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 308(a), (b) (West Supp. 1995).
141. Mangini, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240; see supra notes 25-55 and accompany-
ing text.
142. Mangini, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240.
143. Id. The court noted that the general proscription against "unfair" busi-
ness practices established only a broad, equitable standard to allow courts to
enjoin ongoing wrongful business conduct in whatever context it may occur. Id.
(citing Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn., 496 P.2d 817, 830-31 (Cal.
1972)).
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the Federal Trade Commission Act.14 4  Using the federal
standard, the court of appeal concluded that targeting minors
for cigarette sales was "unfair" and thus violated California's
Unfair Competition Act. 145
The court of appeal also addressed whether the federal
Labeling Act preempted the plaintiff's unfair competition
claim by analyzing the United States Supreme Court holding
in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.146 The court recognized
that the touchstone of the preemption analysis was whether
the plaintiff's claim was predicated upon a duty "based on
smoking and health."147 The court of appeal concluded that
Congress' preservation of the Federal Trade Commission's
authority to regulate "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the advertisement of cigarettes" 148 indicates this standard
should be construed narrowly so as not to proscribe the regu-
lation of unfair cigarette advertising. 149 Thus, having found
144. Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 232, 241 (Ct.
App. 1993). The Court of Appeal justified its adoption of the federal standard
on the ground that the Federal Trade Commission Act contained language simi-
lar to California's Unfair Competition Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). The Act
proscribes "[ulfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)
(1988). It also drew support from People ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co.,
20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Ct. App. 1962), which established that courts may be guided
by interpretation of similar provisions of federal law to determine the scope of
California's Unfair Competition Act. Id. at 521. This court held that the de-
fendant's use of documents assimilating official government forms violated Cal-
ifornia's Unfair Competition Act. Id. at 519, 523. Its decision was based on the
fact that the Federal Trade Commission and a federal circuit court found that
identical conduct violates the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Id. at 518-19.
The Federal Trade Commission uses the following guideline for determin-
ing whether a non-deceptive conduct is nevertheless "unfair": (1) whether the
conduct offends public policy; (2) whether the conduct is immoral, unethical,
oppressive or unscrupulous; and (3) whether the conduct causes substantial in-
jury to consumers. Mangini, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 241 (citing FTC v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244-45, n.5 (1972)).
145. Mangini, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 241. The appeals court concluded that
targeting minors for cigarette sales: (1) offends the public policy established by,
inter alia, California Penal Code section 308 which proscribes the sale of to-
bacco products to persons under the age of 18; (2) oppressively and unscrupu-
lously lures minors into an unhealthy and potentially life-threatening addiction
before they are mature enough to make an informed decision about smoking;
and (3) causes substantial injury to the minors. Id. at 241.
146. Id. at 243. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
147. Mangini, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1336(b) (1988).
149. See Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 232, 243-44
(Ct. App. 1993). The appellate court's conclusion parallels the logic established
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the defendant's conduct was unfair under California's Unfair
Competition Act, the court of appeal concluded that the plain-
tiff's action to enjoin such conduct was not preempted by the
federal Labeling Act. 150
On review, the California Supreme Court did not address
whether the defendant's conduct violated California's Unfair
Competition Act. 151 It affirmed the appeal court's holding
that the defendant's conduct was not preempted by the Label-
ing Act but for a different reason. 152 In its preemption analy-
sis, the California Supreme Court focused on the fact that the
defendant's targeting of minors for cigarette sales violated
the provisions of California Penal Code section 308.153 The
court concluded that the plaintiff's claim was not preempted
because it was predicated on a duty to "not engage in unfair
competition by advertising illegal conduct or encouraging
others to violate the law" rather than a duty based on "smok-
ing and health."' 54 The court defended its holding as consis-
tent with the purpose of the Labeling Act 155 and cited evi-
by the United States Supreme Court in Cipollone. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2608.
In Cipollone, the Supreme Court held that the phrase "smoking and health" did
not encompass regulations of deceptive advertising based on the fact that the
Labeling Act expressly preserved the Federal Trade Commission's authority to
regulate "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the advertisement of ciga-
rettes." Mangini, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1336 (1988)) (em-
phasis added). The appeals court concluded that regulation of unfair cigarette
advertisements is likewise preserved. Id. at 243-44.
Arguably, this holding contravenes the purpose of the Labeling Act to "es-
tablish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and
advertising ... [so that] commerce and national economy may... not be im-
peded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising
regulations." 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988); see supra notes 58-61 and accompanying
text. The fact that California's Unfair Competition Act does not define what
constitutes "unfair" advertisements and, instead, establishes only a broad, equi-
table standard makes the appeal court's decision even more susceptible to this
challenge. See supra notes 103-12, 143-44 and accompanying text.
150. Mangini, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 244.
151. The California Supreme Court limited review "to the merits of the pre-
emption issue" because the defendant did not challenge the lower court's hold-
ing that targeting minors states a valid cause of action under California's Un-
fair Competition Act. Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73, 76
(Cal. 1994).
152. Id. at 81.
153. Id. at 79-80; See CAL. PENAL CODE § 308a (West 1988) (proscribing sale
of tobacco products to persons under the age of 18).
154. Mangini, 875 P.2d at 76.
155. Id. The court stated that its conclusion was consistent with the purpose
of the Labeling Act because the prohibition against advertising to minors did
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dence indicating Congress' intent not to preempt state
regulation of cigarettes sales to minors.
1 56
Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. is significant be-
cause it is the first case involving a successful unfair competi-
tion claim asserted against a tobacco company's promotional
practices. However, its decision sheds little light on the
meaning of the phrase "based on smoking and health" which
governs the preemptive scope of the Labeling Act. 157 This is
because the Mangini decision dealt with the sale of cigarettes
not create "diverse, nonuniform, and confusing standards" and relied instead on
a single, uniform standard. Id. (citation omitted).
156. Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73, 80-82 (Cal. 1994).
The California Supreme Court cited a senate report which states that members
of Congress enacting the Labeling Act did not intend to "affect the power of any
state ... with respect to ... the sale of cigarettes to minors." Id. (citing the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112
S. Ct. 2608, 2624 (1992), which in turn cited Senate Report number 91-566, at
12). The California Supreme Court also referred to more recent federal legisla-
tion, which encourages states to enact and enforce laws prohibiting the sale of
cigarettes to minors, for the proposition that the Labeling Act was not intended
to preempt state regulation of cigarette sales to minors. Id. at 82.
The California Supreme Court may be correct' in concluding that Congress
did not intend to preempt state regulation of cigarettes sales to minors. How-
ever, its more general proposition that claims predicated on a duty to refrain
from "unfairly assist[ing] or advertis[ing] illegal conduct" are saved from pre-
emption seems overbroad. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text. The
mere fact that the tobacco industry promoted conduct violating statutory or
common law does not appear to govern the preemption issue. Rather, the ger-
mane issue appears to be whether the duty imposed by such statutory or com-
mon law is disallowed because of federal preemption provisions.
This is illustrated by the United State Supreme Court's holding in Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992). In concluding that the peti-
tioner's fraudulent misrepresentation claim is preempted to the extent that it
asserts that the respondents neutralized the efficacy or sufficiency of federally
mandated warning labels through their promotional activities, the Supreme
Court focused exclusively on whether the duty sought to be imposed by the com-
mon law fraudulent misrepresentation theory was consistent with the provi-
sions contained in the federal Labeling Act. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2622-23.
More specifically, the Supreme Court noted that the petitioner's claim was
predicated on a duty imposed by state law to refrain from making statements in
advertisement or promotional materials that minimize the health hazards asso-
ciated with smoking. Id. The Court held that such state law requirements
were preempted by the Labeling Act. Id.
Thus, the California Supreme Court's blanket conclusion that claims predi-
cated on a duty to refrain from unfairly assist[ing] or advertis[ing] illegal con-
duct are saved from preemption without first analyzing whether the duty im-
posed by such statutory or common law survives the federal preemption
provisions appears to contradict the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Cipolone.
157. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2621.
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to minors 158 and Congress had already indicated its intent
not to preempt state regulation in this area. 159 It remains to
be seen whether unfair competition claims can be success-
fully asserted against the tobacco industry in contexts which
Congress did not specifically save from preemption.
158. Mangini, 875 P.2d at 78.
159. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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